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Abstract
Recent interest in ‘Risk Management’ has highlighted the relevance of Bayesian
analysis for robust monetary-policy making. This paper sets out a comprehensive
methodology for designing policy rules inspired by such considerations. We design
rules that are robust with respect to model uncertainty facing both the policymaker
and private sector. We apply our methodology to three simple interest-rate rules:
inﬂation-forecast-based (IFB) rules with a discrete forward horizon, one targeting a
discounted sum of forward inﬂation, and a current wage inﬂation rule. We use an esti-
mated DSGE model of the euro area and estimated measures of structured exogenous
and parameter uncertainty for the exercise. We ﬁnd that IFB rules with a long horizon
perform poorly with or without robust design. Our discounted future targeting rule
performs much better, indicating that policy can be highly forward-looking without
compromising stabilization. The wage inﬂation rule dominates whether it is designed
to have good robust properties or not.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E37, E58
Keywords: interest-rate rules, robustness, structured uncertainty5
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Non-Technical Summary
The design of robust policy rules is a fundamental concern for monetary authorities. This
reﬂects the awareness that, when evaluating alternative monetary policies, uncertainties
about the structure of the economy must be given due account. Robust policy is therefore
policy which ‘performs well’ across a number of diﬀerent states of the world. Diﬀerent
states of the world, however, carry diﬀerent probabilities, some highly likely, some not.
Moreover, not all realizations are symmetric: some events, even if inherently unlikely, may
turn out to be highly malevolent. Accordingly, robust policy design might seek not only
to empirically assess the consequences of diﬀerent outcomes but condition policy on the
probabilities of their being realized. This we consider the essence of the Bayesian and, in
turn, ‘risk management’ approaches to robust policy design.
Risk management encompasses two broad arguments. First, the formalization of eco-
nomic uncertainty (i.e., where uncertainty is captured by some known probability distri-
bution, as opposed to Knightian uncertainty). Second, tailoring policy to insure against
severe, adverse outcomes. Consider some examples. During the 1998 Russian debt default,
although the Federal Reserve was understood to believe the US economy could weather the
crisis, monetary policy was nonetheless loosened to partially insure against such an out-
come. Largely speaking, the same events played out in 2003, when concern was expressed
that declining inﬂation could escalate into deﬂation. Despite these speciﬁc examples, the
risk management paradigm has tended to be viewed more as a conceptual framework than
a practical recipe for policy making (Feldstein, 2004). However, some clear-cut points
do emerge. Firstly, reﬂecting the real-world examples and Greenspan’s quote, such a
paradigm is fundamentally Bayesian; policy making involves attaching empirically-relevant
probabilities to diﬀerent states of the world. Secondly, it is diﬀerent from the ‘minimax’
(or worst-case) approach since policy would then have completely accommodated such
scenarios irrespective of their likelihood.
In this paper, we provide a formalization of robust policy design inspired by the
Bayesian/risk management approaches. To our knowledge this has not so far been un-
dertaken in the literature. Having decided upon and (Bayesian) estimated a number of
rival empirical, micro-founded macro models, we use the estimated model probabilities
and posterior parameter densities to design appropriate robust interest-rate rules. In so
doing, we deﬁne risk-management in three dimensions: First, model-robust or ‘M-robust’
rules have stable and unique equilibria by design and, in addition, use the probabilities to
minimize an expected loss function of the central bank subject to this model uncertainty
across central estimates of the models. A typical outcome of Bayesian selection criteria6
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is degenerate odds: one model or scenario absorbs the mass of posterior probability. Ac-
cordingly, we consider a meaningful examination of risk management policies to be the
identiﬁcation of plausible scenarios with reasonably balanced Bayesian odds.
We then adopt a second, more stringent robustness requirement that minimizes the
expected loss across all possible parameter values drawn from a large sample within the
models constructed using the estimated posterior parameter distributions as well as the
model probabilities. We refer to such rules as parameter-robust or ‘P-robust’. The ﬁnal
dimension of risk management is as follows. One downside of robust Bayesian approaches
is the heightened scope for expectation diﬀerences between the private and public sec-
tor. We therefore add a third, ﬁnal dimension to Risk Management rules: that they be
expectationally robust. The central bank must therefore consider scenarios over the dis-
tribution of parameter values where the private sector may believe in an incorrect state of
the world. We refer to such rules as robust with respect to model-inconsistent rules and
where perceptions coincide we use the term model-consistent rules.
Our approach diﬀers from existing work on the design of robust policy rules in a
number of important respects. First, a recent literature has assumed that uncertainty
is unstructured, with malign Nature ‘choosing’ exogenous disturbances to minimize the
welfare criterion that the policymaker is maximizing. However, the worst-case outcome
is likely to represent a very low probability event and, from the Bayesian perspective, it
is inappropriate to design policy heavily conditioned by it. Consequently, mini-max is
not compatible with risk management robust rules. By contrast, we adopt a structured
uncertainty approach.
Second, our paper diﬀers from studies in this latter category that design robust rules
across competing models, but arbitrarily calibrate the relative probabilities of alternative
models being true representations of the economy. In keeping with our theme, we instead
utilize estimated measures of model uncertainty for the design of robust rules. Third,
the rival-model approach typically conﬁnes itself to the ﬁrst (and weaker) robustness
criteria that we consider: M-robustness. We impose an additional and more demanding
robustness criterion, P-robustness, which may possibly (in our most stringent criterion)
involve model-inconsistent expectations as deﬁned previously. Fourth, we examine robust
policy in a uniﬁed framework that compares diﬀerent simple rules with each other, and
with their optimal commitment counterparts.
Fifth, we design rules that are implementable in that they satisfy the zero lower bound
constraint on the nominal interest rate. This turns out to be critical when analyzing
robust policy rules. Finally, our analysis of optimal rules is welfare-optimal, based on a
‘large distortions’ quadratic approximation of the representative household’s utility in a7
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structural micro-founded model.
In particular, we apply our methodology to three simple interest-rate rules: inﬂation-
forecast-based (IFB) rules with a discrete forward horizon, one targeting a discounted
sum of forward inﬂation, and a current wage inﬂation rule. We use an estimated DSGE
model of the euro area and estimated measures of structured exogenous and parameter
uncertainty for the exercise. We ﬁnd that IFB rules with a long horizon perform poorly
with or without robust design. Our discounted future targeting rule performs much better,
indicating that policy can be highly forward-looking without compromising stabilization.
The wage inﬂation rule dominates whether it is designed to have good robust properties
or not.8
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1 Introduction
... the conduct of monetary policy ... has come to involve, at its core, crucial elements of
risk management. This conceptual framework emphasizes understanding as much as pos-
sible the many sources of risk and uncertainty that policymakers faces, quantifying those
risks when possible, and assessing the costs associated with each of the risks. In essence,
the risk management approach to monetary policymaking is an application of Bayesian
decision-making. Alan Greenspan1
... the Governing Council of the ECB has no intention of being the prisoner of a sin-
gle system ... We highly praise robustness. There is no substitute for a comprehensive
analysis of the risks to price stability. Jean-Claude Trichet2
The design of robust policy rules is a fundamental concern for monetary authorities.
This reﬂects the awareness that, when evaluating alternative monetary policies, uncer-
tainties about the structure of the economy must be given due account. Robust policy
is therefore policy which ‘performs well’ across a number of diﬀerent states of the world.
Diﬀerent states of the world, however, carry diﬀerent probabilities, some highly likely,
some not. Moreover, not all realizations are symmetric: some events, even if inherently
unlikely, may turn out to be highly malevolent. Accordingly, robust policy design might
seek not only to empirically assess the consequences of diﬀerent outcomes but condition
policy on the probabilities of their being realized. This we consider the essence of the
Bayesian and, in turn, ‘risk management’ approaches to robust policy design.
Risk management encompasses two broad arguments. First, the formalization of eco-
nomic uncertainty (i.e., where uncertainty is captured by some known probability distri-
bution, as opposed to Knightian uncertainty). Second, tailoring policy to insure against
severe, adverse outcomes. Consider some examples. During the 1998 Russian debt default,
although the Federal Reserve was understood to believe the US economy could weather the
crisis, monetary policy was nonetheless loosened to partially insure against such an out-
come. Largely speaking, the same events played out in 2003, when concern was expressed
that declining inﬂation could escalate into deﬂation. Despite these speciﬁc examples,
the Risk Management paradigm has tended to be viewed more as a conceptual frame-
work than a practical recipe for policy making (Feldstein, 2004). However, some clear-cut
points do emerge. Firstly, reﬂecting the real-world examples and Greenspan’s quote, such a
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probabilities to diﬀerent states of the world. Secondly, it is diﬀerent from the ‘minimax’
(or worst-case) approach since policy would then have completely accommodated such
scenarios irrespective of their likelihood.
We assume the central bank commits to some policy rule (simple or complex) deﬁning
targets and a welfare function reﬂecting preferences. Implemented policy then reﬂects the
interplay of shocks, the rule and the welfare criterion controlling for various forms of un-
certainty. The key aspect being that these sources of uncertainty are weighted by their ap-
propriate probabilities in the policy maker’s expected welfare function. These probabilities
can be wholly subjective reﬂecting the policy maker’s views on the likelihood of diﬀerent
outcomes or their perceived impact. Alternatively, they may reﬂect actual posterior odds
of various models and transmission mechanisms representing the economy. We prefer this
latter deﬁnition since it captures estimated measures of uncertainty. Weighting events by
(perceived) impact evokes mini-max control which has not described risk management in
practice. In our case, the speciﬁcation of a simple policy rule is the means by which the
authorities asses the impact of diﬀerent states of the world. Arguably, much of the existing
robustness literature has failed to exploit the richness of the Bayesian methodology (e.g.,
Sims (2005)).3 For instance, the rival models approach (e.g., Adalid et al. (2005); Levin
et al. (2003)) deﬁnes a robust rule as one that “works well” across a number of models.
In practice, these “number of models” turn out to be few and relatively similar (Svensson
(2003)). However, a more important criticism is that aggregating rival models typically
maps weakly to actual posterior odds; consequently, it is diﬃcult to appreciate the gain
from implementing a rule which performs well in n-1 models but fails in the nth most
data-compatible one. Furthermore, as Cogley and Sargent (2005) demonstrate, monetary
policy making has historically reﬂected judgment about the evolving probability odds of
certain models representing the economy.
In this paper, we provide further formalization of robust policy design inspired by
Bayesian/risk management approaches. To our knowledge this has not so far been un-
dertaken in the literature. Having decided upon and (Bayesian) estimated a number of
rival empirical, micro-founded macro models, we use the estimated model probabilities
and posterior parameter densities to design appropriate robust interest-rate rules. In so
doing, we deﬁne risk-management in three dimensions: First, model-robust or ‘M-robust’
rules have stable and unique equilibria by design and, in addition, use the probabilities
to minimize an expected loss function of the central bank subject to this model uncer-
3This is particularly ironic since the new breed of Bayesian micro-founded models increasingly employed
by central banks (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2003) precisely embody estimated measures of structural model
uncertainty as by-products of their estimation.10
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tainty across central estimates of the models. On M-Robustness, one remark is relevant.
A typical outcome of Bayesian selection criteria is degenerate odds: one model or scenario
absorbs the mass of posterior probability (e.g., Gelman et al. (2003)). This undermines
the entire approach for policy makers and, in so far as degenerate odds reﬂects weak model
identiﬁcation, masks the required degree of robustness required for policy. Accordingly,
we consider a meaningful examination of risk management policies to be the identiﬁcation
of plausible interesting scenarios with reasonably balanced Bayesian odds.
We then adopt a second, more stringent robustness requirement that minimizes the
expected loss across all possible parameter values drawn from a large sample within the
models constructed using the estimated posterior parameter distributions as well as the
model probabilities. We refer to such rules as parameter-robust or ‘P-robust’.
The ﬁnal dimension of risk management is as follows. If the central bank optimizes over
posterior probabilities spaces spanning both M- and P-robust, this may ensure favourable
outcomes but the information environment becomes extremely rich. Consequently, one
downside of robust Bayesian approaches (widely commented upon at the time of the
Greenspan speech by ‘Fed Watchers’4) is the heightened scope for expectation diﬀerences
between the private and public sector. We therefore add a third, ﬁnal dimension to Risk
Management rules: that they be expectationally robust. In designing expectationally
robust rules, the central bank must therefore consider scenarios over the distribution of
parameter values where the private sector may believe in an incorrect state of the world.
We refer to such rules as robust with respect to model-inconsistent rules and where per-
c e p t i o n sc o i n c i d ew eu s et h et e r mmodel-consistent rules.5
Our approach diﬀers from existing work on the design of robust policy rules in a num-
ber of important respects. First, a recent literature draws on Hansen and Sargent (2003),
Hansen and Sargent (2007) in assuming that uncertainty is unstructured, with malign
Nature ‘choosing’ exogenous disturbances to minimize the welfare criterion that the poli-
cymaker is maximizing.6 However, as Svensson (2000) comments, the worst-case outcome
is likely to represent a very low probability event and, from the Bayesian perspective, it
is inappropriate to design policy heavily conditioned by it. Consequently, mini-max is
not compatible with risk management robust rules. By contrast, we adopt a structured
4See for example Miller (2003).
5Frankel and Rockett (1988) and Holtham and Hughes Hallett (1992) study model-inconsistent expec-
tations in a diﬀerent sense: in a world of interdependent economies each with their own central banks, the
latter may each believe in diﬀerent models.
6Walsh (2003) provides a eﬀective overview of robust policy design including the Hansen-Sargent mini-
max approach. Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001) and Levine and Pearlman (2007) provides comparisons
of robust design with structured and unstructured uncertainty.11
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uncertainty approach.
Second, our paper diﬀers from studies in this latter category that design robust rules
across competing models, but arbitrarily calibrate the relative probabilities of alternative
models being true representations of the economy (e.g., Angeloni et al. (2003), Levin et al.
(2003), Adalid et al. (2005), Cogley and Sargent (2005), Coenen (2007) ). In keeping with
our theme, we instead utilize estimated measures of model uncertainty for the design of
robust rules.7
Third, the rival-model approach typically conﬁnes itself to the ﬁrst (and weaker) ro-
bustness criteria that we consider: M-robustness. We impose an additional and more
demanding robustness criterion, P-robustness, which may possibly (in our most stringent
criterion) involve model-inconsistent expectations as deﬁned previously. Fourth, we ex-
amine robust policy in a uniﬁed framework that compares diﬀerent simple rules with each
other, and with their optimal commitment counterparts.
Fifth, we design rules that are implementable in that they satisfy the zero lower bound
constraint on the nominal interest rate. This turns out to be critical when analyzing robust
policy rules. For instance, in contrast with the familiar Brainard (1967) result, mini-max
robust control advocates a strong degree of policy activism. But strong policy activism
risks running aground of the lower bound constraint (Levine and Pearlman (2007)). In-
deed, in many robustness exercises the probability of optimal polices violating the lower
bound constraint is left unreported and unknown. Feasible policy, however, must respect
the lower bound. Finally, our analysis of optimal rules is welfare-optimal, based on a
‘large distortions’ quadratic approximation of the representative household’s utility in a
structural micro-founded model.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 describes the
procedure for approximating the optimization problem in a LQ form. Section 4 provides
the results for the Bayesian maximum-likelihood estimation of our core model and several
variants. Section 5 ﬁrst focuses on optimized simple interest-rate rules and the fully
optimal rule without model uncertainty before we turn to the robust policy problem in
section 6. Section 7 concludes.
7The Bayesian model averaging method of Brock et al. (2007) also estimate the relative probabilities,
but is conﬁned to M-robustness. Our extension to P-Robustness is in the spirit of the comments by Sims
(2005) on that paper.12
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2 The Model
2.1 The Smets-Wouters Model
We employ the inﬂuential Smets-Wouters model of the Euro area (Smets and Wouters
(2003), henceforth SW). The SW model is an extended version of the standard New-
Keynesian DSGE closed-economy model with sticky prices and wages estimated by Bayesian
techniques. It features three agents: households, ﬁrms and the monetary policy authority.
Households maximize a utility function with two arguments (consumption and leisure)
over an inﬁnite horizon. Consumption appears in the utility function relative to a time-
varying external habit-formation variable. Labour is diﬀerentiated over households, so
that there is some monopoly power over wages, which results in an explicit wage equation
and allows for the introduction of sticky nominal Calvo-type wages contracts. House-
holds also rent capital services to ﬁrms and decide how much capital to accumulate given
adjustment costs. Firms produce diﬀerentiated goods, decide on factor inputs, and set
Calvo-type price contracts. Wage and price setting is augmented by the assumption that
those prices and wages that can not be freely set are partially indexed to past inﬂation.
Prices are therefore set as a function of current and expected real marginal cost, but are
also inﬂuenced by past inﬂation. Real marginal cost depends on wages and the rental rate
of capital. The short-term nominal interest rate is the instrument of monetary policy. The
stochastic behavior of the model is driven by ten exogenous shocks: ﬁve shocks arising
from technology and preferences, three cost-push shocks and two monetary-policy shocks.
Consistent with the DSGE set up, potential output is deﬁned as the level of output that
would prevail under ﬂexible prices and wages in the absence of cost-push shocks.
We incorporate one important modiﬁcation to the SW model: the addition of distor-
tionary taxes at the steady state. As we will see this has a bearing on the ineﬃciency at
the steady state, the quadratic approximation of the utility function used for the welfare
analysis and the existence of an inﬂationary bias.
2.2 Households













where β is the household’s discount factor, UC,t,a n dUL,t are preference shocks common to
all households, Ct(r) is an index of consumption, Lt(r) are hours worked, HC,t represents
‘external habit’ in consumption, or the desire not to diﬀer too much from other households,13
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and we choose HC,t = hCt−1,w h e r eCt = 1
ν
 ν
r=1 Ct(r) is the average consumption index,
h ∈ [0,1). When h =0 ,σ>1 is the risk aversion parameter (or the inverse of the
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution). We normalize the household number to unity.
The representative household r must obey a budget constraint:
(1 + TC,t)Pt(Ct(r)+I(r)) + Et[Dt+1Bt+1(r)] = (1 − TY,t)PtYt(r)+Bt(r)+TRt (2)
where Pt is the GDP price index and It(r) is investment. Assuming complete ﬁnancial
markets, Bt+1(r) is a random variable denoting the payoﬀ of the portfolio Bt(r), purchased
at time t,a n dDt+1 is the stochastic discount factor over the interval [t,t +1 ]t h a tp a y s
one unit of currency in a particular state of period t + 1 divided by the probability of
an occurrence of that state given information available in period t. The nominal rate of
return on bonds (the nominal interest rate), Rt, is then given by the relation Et[Dt+1]=
1
1+Rt. The tax structure is as follows: TRt are lump-sum transfers to households by the
government net of lump-sum taxes, TC,t and TY,t are consumption and income tax rates
respectively. The income tax rate is paid on total income, PtYt(r), given by
PtYt(r)=Wt(r)Lt(r)+( RK,tZt(r) − Ψ(Zt(r))PtKt−1(r)+Γ t(r)( 3 )
where Wt(r) is the nominal wage rate, RK,t is the real return on beginning-of period t
capital stock, Kt−1, owned by households, Zt(r) ∈ [0,1] is the degree of capital utilization
with costs PtΨ(Zt(r))Kt−1(r)w h e r eΨ  , Ψ   > 0, and Γt(r) is income from dividends
derived from the imperfectly competitive intermediate ﬁrms plus the net cash inﬂow from
state-contingent securities. We ﬁrst consider the case of ﬂexible wages and introduce wage
stickiness later.
Capital accumulation is given by
Kt(r)=( 1− δ)Kt−1(r)+( 1− S (Xt(r)))It(r)( 4 )
where δ is the depreciation rate, Xt(r)=
UI,tIt(r)
It−1(r) , UI,t is a shock to investment costs and
the investment adjustment cost function, S(·), has the properties S(1) = S (1) = 0. As
seen below, intermediate ﬁrms employ diﬀerentiated labour with a CES aggregator with








   1
0 Wt(r)1−ηdr
  1
1−η is an average wage index and Lt =







Household r chooses {Ct(r)}, {Mt(r)}, {Kt(r)}, {Z(r)} and {Wt(r)} to maximize (1)
subject to (2)–(5), taking external habit HC,t, interest rates and prices and as given.14
ECB
Working Paper Series No 870
February 2008
The insurance provided by state-contingent securities (the complete ﬁnancial markets
assumption) enables us to impose symmetry on households (so that Ct(r)=Ct, etc).




















(Qt+1(1 − δ)+RK,t+1Zt − Ψ(Zt+1))
 
(7)

































t (Ct − HC,t)σ (10)
where MUC
t = UC,t(Ct − HC,t)−σ and MUL
t = −UL,tL
φ
t are the marginal utilities of
consumption and work respectively. Condition (6) is the familiar Keynes-Ramsey rule
adapted to incorporate habit in consumption. In (7) and (8), Qt is the real value of capital
(Tobin’s Q) and these conditions describe optimal investment behavior. (9) describes
optimal capacity utilization and (10) equates the real disposable wage with the marginal
rate of substitution (MRSt) between consumption and leisure and reﬂects the monopolistic
market power of households supplying a diﬀerentiated factor input with elasticity η.
2.3 Firms
Competitive ﬁnal goods ﬁrms use a continuum of intermediate goods according to a con-
stant returns CES technology to produce aggregate output
Yt =





where ζ is the elasticity of substitution and the ﬁrm number is normalized to unity. This






Yt where Pt =
   1
0 Pt(f)1−ζdf
  1
1−ζ is an aggregate price index.
In the intermediate goods sector each good f is produced by a single ﬁrm f using
diﬀerentiated labour and capital with a Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yt(f)=At(Zt(f)Kt−1(f))αLt(f)1−α − F (12)15
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where Zt(f) denotes capacity utilization, F are ﬁxed costs of production and
Lt(f)=





is an index of diﬀerentiated labour types used by the ﬁrm, where Lt(r,f) is the labour
input of type r by ﬁrm f. At is an exogenous shock capturing shifts to trend total factor
productivity in this sector. The cost of labour is (1+TL,t)Wt where TL,t is a payroll tax paid
by the ﬁrm. Minimizing costs PtRK,tZt(f)Kt−1(f)+( 1+TL,t)WtLt(f) and aggregating
over ﬁrms leads to the demand for labour as in (5), where
  1







In an equilibrium of equal households and ﬁrms, all wages adjust to the same level Wt and
it follows that Yt = At(ZtKt−1)αL1−α
t − F. The ﬁrm’s cost-minimizing real marginal cost









K,tα−α(1 − α)−(1−α) (15)
2.4 Price and Wage-Setting
Turning to price and wage-setting, we follow the standard Calvo framework supplemented
with indexation. Thus, at each period there is a probability of 1 − ξp and 1 − ξw that the
price and wage is set optimally. The optimal price derives from maximizing discounted
proﬁts whilst wages are set such as to maximize discounted the utility from labour con-
sumption minus the disutility of labour eﬀort. For those ﬁrms and workers unable to
reset, prices and wages are indexed to last period’s aggregate inﬂation, with indexation
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2.5 Equilibrium and Interest Rate Rule
In equilibrium, goods markets, money markets and the bond market all clear. Equating
the supply and demand of the consumer good we obtain
Yt = At(ZtKt−1)αL1−α
t − F = Ct + Gt + It +Ψ ( Zt)Kt−1 (20)
We examine the dynamic behaviour in the vicinity of a steady state in which the govern-
ment budget constraint is in balance; i.e.,
TRt + PtGt =( TY,t + TC,t)PtYt + TL,tWtLt (21)
As in Coenen et al. (2007) we further assume that changes in government spending are
ﬁnanced exclusively by changes in lump-sum taxes with tax rates TY,t, TC,t and TL,t held
constant at their steady-state values.
Given the path of the interest rate, {Rt} (expressed later in terms of an optimal or IFB
rule) the money supply is ﬁxed by the central banks to accommodate money demand. By
Walras’ Law we can dispense with the bond market equilibrium condition and therefore
the household constraint. Then the equilibrium is deﬁned at t = 0 by stochastic processes
Ct, Bt, It, Pt, Lt, Kt, Zt, RK,t, Wt, Yt, given past price indices and exogenous shocks and
government spending processes.
The model is estimated in linearized form about a zero-inﬂation steady state, both
set out below. For estimation purposes only, the model is closed with a linear ‘empirical’
Taylor rule of the form
rt = ρrt−1 +( 1− ρ)[¯ πt + θπEt(πt+j − ¯ πt+j)+θy(yt − ˆ yt)] + θΔπ(πt − πt−1)
+ θΔy(Δyt − Δˆ yt)+ R,t (22)
where ¯ πt+1 = ρπ¯ πt+ π,t+1 is an inﬂation target shock process, and  R,t is an i.i.d. nominal
interest-rate shock. In the policy exercises, this rule is replaced with optimal counterparts
( fully optimal or optimized ‘simple rules’).17
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2.6 Zero-Inﬂation Steady State
For the cashless economy, deterministic zero-inﬂation steady state, denoted by variables
without the time subscripts, Et−1(UC,t)=1a n dEt−1(UL,t)=κ is given by
1=β(1 + R) (23)
Q = β(Q(1 − δ)+RKZ − Ψ(Z)) (24)
RK =Ψ  (Z) (25)
Q = 1 (26)

































Y = C +( δ +Ψ ( Z))K + G (33)
TR+ PG =( TY + TC)PY + TLWL (34)
determining R, Z, Q, W
P , L, K, RK,M C ,C, Y and possible tax structures, (TR,TY ,T C),
given G. In our cashless economy the price level is indeterminate.
The solution for steady state values decomposes into a number of independent calcu-





which is thus pinned down by the household’s discount factor. Equations (24) to (26) give
1=β[1 − δ + ZΨ (Z) − Ψ(Z)] (36)
which determines steady state capacity utilization. As in SW we assume that Z =1a n d
Ψ(1) = 0 so that (36) and (25) imply that RK =Ψ  (Z)= 1
β −1+δ = R+δ meaning that
perfect capital market conditions apply in the deterministic steady state.8
8As we shall see later Z is socially eﬃcient thus justifying the assumption Z =1 .18
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Denote the total tax wedge by T between the real eﬀective wage income of households
(the purchasing power of the post-tax wage) and the real eﬀective labour cost of ﬁrms.
Then
T ≡ 1 −
1 − TY
(1 + TC)(1 + TL)
  TY + TC + TL (39)


































Equations (40), with K
L deﬁned by (37), and RK = 1
β − 1+δ, together deﬁne the natural
rate of output in terms of underlying parameters and the tax wedge T.T h u s g i v e n
government spending as a proportion of GDP, the natural rate of output falls as market
power in output and labour markets increases (with decreases in ζ and η respectively) and
the tax wedge T increases. However external habit in consumption causes households to
supply more labour thus increasing the natural rate of output. Market power, taxes and
external habit are all sources of ineﬃciency, but as we shall now see in section 2.7, they
do not impact on eﬃciency in the same direction.
2.7 The Ineﬃciency of the Zero-Inﬂation Steady State
To examine the ineﬃciency of the steady state we consider the social planner’s problem















with respect to {Ct}, {Kt}, {Lt} and {Zt}, subject to the resource constraint
Yt = At(ZtKt−1)αL1−α
t − F = Ct + Gt + Kt − (1 − δ)Kt−1 +Ψ ( Zt)Kt−1 (42)
To solve this optimization problem deﬁne the Lagrangian










Working Paper Series No 870
February 2008
First order conditions are:
Ct :( Ct − hCt−1)−σ − βh(Ct+1 − hCt)−σ − μt = 0 (44)
Kt : −μt +
 







μt+1 = 0 (45)
Lt : −κL
φ





μt = 0 (46)






The eﬃcient steady-state levels of output Yt+1 = Yt = Yt−1 = Y ∗, is therefore found
by solving the system:
[(1 − h)C]
−σ (1 − βh) − μ = 0 (48)





− βΨ(Z) = 0 (49)





μ = 0 (50)






Solving as we did for the natural rate and denoting the social optimum by Z∗, Y ∗ etc
we arrive at
1=β[1 − δ + Z∗Ψ (Z∗) − Ψ(Z∗)] (52)
Hence comparing (52) and (36) it can be seen that Z∗ = Z =1 .T h u st h enatural rate of


























it follows that the natural capital-labour ratio is below the social optimum. The socially




























The ineﬃciency of the natural rate of output can now be found by comparing (40)
with (54). Since Y φ+δ is an increasing function of Y , we arrive at:9
9This generalizes the result in Choudhary and Levine (2006) which considered the same model, but
without capital.20
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Proposition
The natural level of output, Y , is below the eﬃcient level, Y ∗, if and only if
































































≥ or ≤ 0 (56)
summarizes the overall distortion in the steady state natural level of output as a result
of four distortions: taxes, market power in the output and labour markets and external




Y = F ∗
Y ∗. It then follows that Θ > 1. In the case where there is no habit persistence
(h = 0), then Φy > 0 and (55) always holds. Then tax distortions and market power in
the output and labour markets, captured by the elasticities η ∈ (0,∞)a n dζ ∈ (0,∞)
respectively, drive the natural rate of output below the eﬃcient level. If h = T =0a n d
η = ζ = ∞, tax distortions and market power both disappear, Φy = 0 and the natural
rate is eﬃcient. But if h>0, this leads to the possibility that Φy < 0 and then the natural
rate of output is actually above the eﬃcient level (see Choudhary and Levine (2006)).
How big is the steady state distortion in the SW model? For parameter values esti-
mated in section 4, for the core SW version and ζ =7 .67, corresponding to a 15% mark-up,
ﬁgure 1 shows the value for Φy corresponding to an interval T ∈ [0,0.5] for the tax wedge.
In the original SW model taxes are assumed to be non-distortionary so T =0 . T h e n
the distortion is negative, (55) does not hold and the social optimum level of output in
the steady state is below the natural rate. ‘Corrective taxes’ as in Layard (2006) may
then be necessary to encourage people to work less. However, from Figure 1 we see that
the appropriate level of such a tax is far less than the average tax wedge in the euro area
reported in Coenen et al. (2007) of about 50%, at which level the distortion is positive and
large. The quadratic approximation therefore requires the ‘large distortions’ procedure to
which we now turn.
10This generalizes Woodford (2003), page 394 to include capital, labour-market power and habit.21
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Figure 1: Steady State Distortion and the Tax Wedge
3 LQ Approximation and the ZLB Constraint
This section implements the procedure set out in Levine et al. (2007b) to obtain a quadratic
approximation of the utility function and a linear state-space representation of the model
dynamics in the region of the zero-inﬂation steady state. As we have shown that with euro-
area levels of taxation, we cannot assume that distortions are small in this steady state.
To implement the large distortions quadratic approximation, we ﬁrst need to express the
price and wage-setting ﬁrst order conditions as stochastic non-linear diﬀerence equations.














and use Dt+k = βk MUC
t
Pt+k where MUC
t =( Ct − hCt−1)−σ is the marginal utility of con-
sumption. Recalling that Λt =
MUC
t
Pt , aggregate price dynamics are then given by










(1 − 1/ζ)(1 − 1/η)(1 − Tt)
(61)
ΥtHt = Jt (62)
1=ξ˜ Π
ζ−1
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Nt = Ot (64)






































3.2 The Utility Function in Terms of Wage and Price Dispersions













Since we assume complete risk-sharing within each bloc, each consumer’s consumption is
identical; i.e., Ct(r)=Ct. However households diﬀer in their labour supply because in
each period some can re-optimize their wage contracts. To obtain the social welfare we
then require the average value of Lt(r)1+φ across households. Let Lt(f,r) be the labour








 −η   1
0
Lt(f)df
where Lt(f) the index of diﬀerentiated labour employed by ﬁrm f. Then following Levine



































(Δwrt + πt − γw(Δwrt−1 + πt−1))2 (71)
3.3 Large Distortions Quadratic Approximation of Utility
We have now expressed utility in terms of price and wage variances. Together with the
household’s ﬁrst-order conditions, the capital accumulation equation, price and wage set-
ting expressed as diﬀerence equations, we can write down the deterministic non-linear23
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Ramsey optimization problem. The quadratic approximation of the single-period utility
derived from (68), (70) and (71) can then be obtained in a conceptually straightforward
fashion as the second-order Taylor series approximation about the steady state of the
Ramsey problem of the associated Hamiltonian. For our model and parameter values this
turns out to be the zero-inﬂation steady state. Details are given in Levine et al. (2007b)
and Appendix A provides a brief summary.
In the limit as the zero-inﬂation steady state becomes eﬃcient then it is possible to
obtain an analytical form of the quadratic approximation of the single-period welfare loss,
Ut. As shown in LMP, this takes the form
Ut = wc(ct − hct−1)2 + wll2
t + wπ(πt − γpπt−1)2 + wΔw(Δwt − γwΔwt−1)2
+ wlk(lt − kt−1 − zt −
1
1 − α
at)2 + wz(zt + ψat)2 − walatlt − wi(it − it−1)2 (72)
where positive weights wc etc are deﬁned in LMP. All variables are in log-deviation form
about the steady state as in the linearization. The ﬁrst four terms in (72) give the welfare
loss from consumption, employment, price inﬂation and wage inﬂation variability respec-
tively. The remaining terms are contributions that arise from the resource constraint in
our quadratic approximation. In a ﬂexi-price and ﬂexi-wage economy wΔw and wπ are zero
and the ﬁrst two terms in (72) dominate. For the high levels of price and wage stickiness
estimated in the SW model however, it is these coeﬃcients on price and wage inﬂation
variability that dominate. Although we use a large-distortions quadratic approximation
without the convenient analytical form of (72), this feature of the small-distortions ap-
proximation is indicative of the importance of price and wage inﬂation variability in the
choice of policy rules.
3.4 Linearization about the Zero-Inﬂation Steady State
We ﬁnally linearize about the deterministic zero-inﬂation steady state. Deﬁne all lower
case variables as proportional deviations from this baseline steady state except for rates
of change which are absolute deviations.11 Then the linearization takes the form:
11That is, for a typical variable Xt, xt =
Xt−X




where X is the baseline steady state. For
variables expressing a rate of change over time such as rt and πt, xt = Xt − X.24
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(rt − Etπt+1 + EtuC,t+1 − uC,t) (73)



















S  (1)(1 + β)








(1 − βξp)(1 − ξp)
(1 + βγp)ξp
mct +  P,t (77)
kt =( 1 − δ)kt−1 + δit (78)
mct =( 1 − α)wrt +
α
RK


















(1 − βξw)(1 − ξw)
(1 + β)ξw(1 + ηφ)




(ct − hct−1)+φlt + uL,t (81)
lt = kt−1 +
1
RK
(1 + ψ)rK,t − wrt (82)
yt = cyct + gygt + iyit + kyψrK,t (83)
yt = φF[at + α(
ψ
RK




uC,t+1 = ρCuC,t +  C,t+1 (85)
uL,t+1 = ρLuL,t +  L,t+1 (86)
uI,t+1 = ρIuI,t+  I,t+1 (87)
gt+1 = ρggt +  g,t+1 (88)
at+1 = ρaat +  a,t+1 (89)
where “ineﬃcient cost-push” shocks  Q,t+1,  P,t+1 and  W,t+1 have been added to value of
capital, the marginal cost and real wage equations respectively. Variables yt, ct, mct, uC,t,
uL,t, at, gt are proportional deviations about the steady state. [ C,t,  l,t,  g,t,  a,t] are i.i.d.
disturbances. πt, rK,t and rt are absolute deviations about the steady state.12 To obtain
the output gap, the diﬀerence between output for the sticky price model obtained above,
and output when prices and wages are ﬂexible, ˆ yt say. Following SW we also eliminate
12Note that in the SW model ˆ rK,t is deﬁned as
rK,t
RK .T h e n zt =
Ψ (Z)
ZΨ  (Z)ˆ rK,t = ψˆ rK,t. In our set-up
zt =
ψ
RK rK,t has been eliminated.25
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the ineﬃcient shocks from this target level of output. The latter is obtained by setting
ξp = ξw =  Q,t+1 =  P,t+1 =  W,t+1 = 0 in (77) to (83).13
Table 1 provides a summary of our notation.
3.5 The LQ Problem











+ Brt + C t (90)
where zt is an (n − m) × 1 vector of predetermined variables including non-stationary
processed, z0 is given, xt is an m × 1 vector of non-predetermined variables and xe
t+1,t
denotes rational (model consistent) expectations of xt+1 formed at time t.L e ty 
t =[ z 
t x 
t].
Following the procedure set out above, the inter-temporal welfare loss of the represen-









where Q is symmetric and non-negative deﬁnite. This completes the LQ approximation
of the original non-linear, non-quadratic optimization problems considered in the rest of
the paper. The procedures for evaluating the optimal policy rules are outlined in Levine
et al. (2007c) (or Currie and Levine (1993) for a more detailed treatment).14
3.6 Imposing the Nominal Interest-Rate Zero Lower Bound Constraint
Now our optimization problem is expressed in LQ form we can impose an interest-rate zero
lower bound (ZLB) constraint in a straightforward way. As in Woodford (2003), chapter










13Note that the zero-inﬂation steady states of the sticky and ﬂexi-price steady states are the same. In
fact given the rules we actually examine in this paper, the output gap is only required in the estimation.
14The standard DSGE model assumes no growth, so when estimating one has to de-trend the data.
When investigating optimal policy, there is again little problem, since all quadratic weights for the linear-
quadratic approximation are weighted by the same term C
1−σ. If we assume a balanced growth steady
state path however, the utility function of the household has to be modiﬁed. A simple modiﬁcation that
















where ¯ Ct is the steady state consumption balanced growth path.26
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Then following Levine et al. (2007c), the policymaker’s optimization problem is to choose
wr such that the probability, p, of the interest rate hitting the lower bound is very low.
This is implemented by calibrating the weight wr for each of our policy rules so that
z0(p)σr <Rwhere z0(p) is the critical value of a standard normally distributed variable
Z such that prob (Z ≤ z0)=p.15
4 Estimation
The Bayesian Maximum-Likelihood approach taken in this paper follows work by DeJong
et al. (2000b,a), Otrok (2001), and SW. There are by now numerous applications of the
approach which can be seen as a combination of likelihood methods and the calibration
methodology. Bayesian analysis allows formally incorporating uncertainty and prior in-
formation regarding the parametrization of the model by combining the likelihood with a
prior density for the parameters of interest based on results from earlier microeconometric
or macroeconometric studies.
Let us assume that the model outlined in section 2 represents the central bank’s fun-
damental view of the economy. Nevertheless, the policy maker will always harbour un-
certainty about the strength of various frictions within that framework. In this particular
model, such frictions include habit persistence, factor adjustment costs, autoregressive
shock processes, nominal stickiness etc; uncertainty about the strength of any of these
frictions have implications for the transmission and conduct of monetary policy. Accord-
ingly, in this paper, we examine robust monetary policy whereby the likelihood of various
states of the world conditions the decision strategies of the policy maker. Two concerns
were upper most in our minds: to identify frictions directly relevant for monetary policy
but which also generate a reasonably even spread of “Bayesian Odds” in order to generate
15The ZLB constraint can be further eased by shifting the interest rate distribution to the right. Then
steady state inﬂation rate in the optimal policy is positive. Let π




is the steady state nominal interest rate. Given σr the steady state positive inﬂation rate that will ensure
rt ≥ 0 with probability 1−p is given by π





×100,0]. Furthermore if π
∗ is chosen
in a optimal fashion, it is a credible new steady state inﬂation rate. (See Levine et al. (2007c)). In this
paper however we retain zero inﬂation as a steady state feature of the policy rules. Note that in our LQ
framework, the zero interest-rate bound is very occasionally hit. Then the interest rate is allowed to become
negative, possibly using a scheme proposed by Gesell (1934) and Keynes (1936). Our approach to the ZLB
constraint (following Woodford, 2003) in eﬀect replaces it with a nominal interest-rate variability constraint
which ensures the ZLB is hardly ever hit. By contrast the work of a number of authors including Adam
and Billi (2007), Coenen and Wieland (2003), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Eggertsson (2006)
study optimal monetary policy with commitment in the face of a non-linear constraint rt ≥ 0 which allows
for frequent episodes of liquidity traps in the form of rt =0 .27
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a meaningful exercise.
Naturally, a key concern for monetary policy relates to how much nominal inertia exists
in the economy. The degree of nominal stickiness in the economy has implications, for
example, for the speed with which central banks react to shocks. Accordingly, we take our
core estimated model and (re-)estimate another four variants with key nominal-persistence
mechanisms altered: namely, where indexation in prices and wages is eliminated jointly
or individually or treated symmetrically. The results are shown in Table 2 at the end of
the paper.16
We see that the baseline model - where both wage and price indexation is allowed -
performs relatively well with the second highest odds. However, it would appear that the
data prefer no indexation in the real wage to inﬂation (with a model probability 0.85),
whilst it strongly rejects zero price indexation. Given this distribution of odds, the policy
maker may conclude there are two highly likely states of the world: the core model and
one where real wages are driven by their own dynamics, expected inﬂation, an optimality
condition but without indexation to inﬂation histories. However, two other states of the
world appear non negligible: whereby indexation is treated jointly zero or symmetrically
(adding up to odds of 6%). Accordingly, in what follows, we condition our robust monetary
policy exercises on the these four cases. Then given equal prior weights, one can determine












To summarize, it turns out that the probability for the γP = 0 variant is negligible, so
we retain only the following four variants for our subsequent robustness analysis:
Model 1: γP > 0, γW > 0, probability=0.09
Model 2: γP = γW > 0, probability=0.05
Model 3: γP = γW = 0, probability=0.01
Model 4: γW = 0, probability=0.85.
As discussed in the introduction for the design of M-robust rules to be useful we re-
quire odds which do not massively support one variant. In fact we have a spread of odds
which are all reasonably signiﬁcant and so satisfy this requirement.
16As in SW the following parameters are imposed with calibrated values: β =0 .99, α =0 .3, η =3 ,
δ =0 .025, cy =0 .60, iy =0 .22 and gy =0 .18. Furthermore, we put T =0 .4.28
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5 Optimal Monetary Policy without Model Uncertainty
5.1 Optimal Policy
In the absence of model uncertainty we ﬁrst examine the four estimate variants of the
model under the optimal commitment policy. Parameter values are ﬁxed at the mean of
the posterior distributions. Each model in turn is considered as the true model believed by
the private sector and central bank alike. First consider optimal policy without a nominal
interest-rate ZLB constraint. Table 3a sets out the outcomes in terms of steady state
variances of key variables. Throughout the paper, we adopt a conditional welfare loss
measure, starting at the zero-inﬂation steady state.17
Baseline γW =0 γW = γP =0 γP = γW
(Model 1) (Model 4) (Model 3) (Model 2)
var(yt) 20.4 21.3 21.1 20.8
var(ct) 21.0 21.8 22.5 21.4
var(πt) 0.0654 0.0626 0.0521 0.0611
var(qt) 64.3 62.3 60.7 62.4
var(it) 116 120 121 119
var(lt) 7.45 7.78 7.49 7.47
var(wrt) 9.00 10.3 9.79 9.35
var(rt) 3.00 2.80 3.11 3.10
Prob ZLB 0.281 0.274 0.284 0.284
Ω0(wr) 152.9 145.1 142.7 155.5
cMODEL
e (%) 0 -0.17 -0.23 0.06
Table 3a: Variances in %2 a n dE x p e c t e dW e l f a r eL o s s :wr =0 .001.
In this table, cMODEL
e =
Ω0(wr)i−Ω0(wr)1
1−ha × 10−2 across alternative model variants is
the welfare diﬀerence relative to model 1 in % permanent consumption equivalent units
relative to the steady state, where ha =0 .55 is the average of h across model variants.18
17An unconditional welfare loss measure averages over all possible initial states using the distribution
of states calculated under the optimal commitment policy (see, for example Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2006)). However, for a discount factor close to unity, the diﬀerences between the measures are second
order.
18To work out the welfare in terms of a consumption equivalent percentage increase, expanding U(C)=
C1−σ(1−h)1−σ
1−σ as a Taylor series, a 1% permanent increase in consumption of 1 per cent yields a ﬁrst-order




1−σ × 0.01. Losses X reported in the Tables have been
scaled such that utility loss is C
1−σ(1 − h)
−σX × 10
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In terms of welfare outcomes we see that the four variants diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Eliminating
wage indexation yields a welfare improvement (reduction in welfare loss) of ce =0 .17%
permanent increase in consumption. The further elimination of price indexation increases
this improvement to ce =0 .23%. Imposing γP = γW > 0 on the other hand sees a welfare
reduction (increase in welfare loss) of ce =0 .06%. The diﬀerence between the best and
worst welfare outcomes is ce =0 .29%, a substantial welfare gain. It should be noted that in
our LQ approximation our procedure includes all components of welfare and does not drop
and terms independent of policy as is sometimes the case in the literature. It follows that
the welfare for diﬀerent model variants in Table 3a can be compared and that these values
are measures of the minimum costs of ﬂuctuations driven by the exogenous processes. In
consumption equivalent terms, these are over 3% of steady state consumption, an order
of magnitude of 100 times those in Lucas (1987).19
Baseline γW =0 γW = γP =0 γP = γP
(Model 1) (Model 4) (Model 3) (Model 2)
var(yt) 20.0 20.9 20.9 20.4
var(ct) 19.9 20.8 21.4 20.4
var(πt) 0.065 0.062 0.052 0.061
var(qt) 62.6 61.3 59.3 60.6
var(it) 120 123 124 121
var(lt) 7.21 7.57 7.23 7.24
var(wrt) 9.16 10.4 9.89 9.51
var(rt) 0.243 0.246 0.243 0.249
Prob ZLB) 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.023
Ω0(wr) 160.4 151.7 149.8 163.3
Ω0(0) 156.8 148.4 146.4 159.6
cMODEL
e 0 -0.19 -0.23 0.062
cZLB
e 0.087 0.073 0.082 0.091
wr 30 27 28 30
Table 3b: Variances in %2 a n dE x p e c t e dW e l f a r eL o s s :wr =3 0 . 20
19The reason for these contrasting results lies in the contribution of wage and price variability to that
of labour supply in household utility (see also Ball and Romer (1990)). Our welfare costs of ﬂuctuations
compare with estimates around 2% found in Levin et al. (2006) for a similar model, but with internal habit
and estimated using US data.
20c
ZLB




1−¯ h × 10
−2.30
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In a sense these results are misleading since the probability of hitting the interest-rate
lower bound is high in all cases. Almost one in three quarters would see this event happen
on average. To impose the ZLB constraint we increase the weight penalizing the variability
of the interest rate, wr, in (92) until this probability reduces to less than 0.025. Then the
true welfare is evaluated under this rule by subtracting the contribution of interest-rate
variability to the modiﬁed loss function. Table 3b shows the results of this exercise. The
ZLB constraint with a probability of less than 0.025 of hitting a zero interest rate is
achieved by choosing wr between 27 and 30, depending on the model variant. The cost
in terms of a reduced stochastic welfare in percentage consumption equivalent terms is in
the region [0.073,0.091].
5.2 Optimized IFB Rules
We now turn to optimized IFB rules feeding back on either current inﬂation alone or on
j-period ahead, j ≥ 1 expected inﬂation of the general form:
rt = ρrt−1 + θπEtπt+j (94)
where ρ ∈ [0,1],θ π > 0,j≥ 0. In what follows we denote such a rule by IFBj.F o rρ<1,




θπ(1 − ρ)−1Etπt+j − rt
 
which is a partial adjustment
to a static IFBj rule rt = θπ(1 − ρ)−1Etπt+j.I f ρ =1w eh a v ea nintegral rule that is
equivalent to the interest rate responding to a price level target.21
wr [ρ,θπ] σ2
r Prob ZLB Ω(wr) Ω(0)
0 [0, 5.765] 2.17 0.251 182.08 182.08
10 [0.588,1.830] 0.49 0.076 186.53 184.08
20 [0.600,1.603] 0.42 0.062 188.83 184.66
30 [0.625,1.484] 0.38 0.053 190.52 184.87
40 [0.719,1.008] 0.24 0.021 190.87 186.88
Table 4a: Imposing the ZLB: Baseline Model and j =0Price Inﬂation Rule.
Table 4a sets out the procedure for imposing the ZLB for the contemporaneous inﬂation
rule (IFB0) and the baseline model 1. As we increase wr, we reduce the equilibrium
variance and the probability of hitting the ZLB. Rules become more inertial (ρ rises) and
21Unlike its non-integral counterpart, an integral rule responding to inﬂation does not require observa-
tions of the steady state (natural) rate of interest, about which it is expressed, to implement. The merits
of price level versus inﬂation targeting are examined in Vestin (2006).31
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the instantaneous feedback from current inﬂation (θπ) falls. At wr = 40 the probability
of hitting the lower bound is below 0.025, the target we impose in all our subsequent
exercises.
Table 4b sets out analogous results for IFBj rules, j ∈ [1, 8] for the baseline model and
includes the result from table 4a for comparison. In these tables we add a column that
calculates the consumption equivalent loss compared with the Ramsey policy in table 3a





(1−h) . Tables 4c - 4e repeat this exercise for model variants 2-4.
j wr [ρ,θπ] σ2
r Prob ZLB Ω(wr) Ω(0) ce
0 40 [0.719,1.008] 0.24 0.021 190.87 186.88 0.77
1 20 [0.719,1.008] 0.24 0.021 190.87 186.88 0.77
2 10 [0.545,6.172] 0.25 0.023 179.57 178.32 0.58
3 0 [0.591,9.271] 0.22 0.017 178.80 178.80 0.59
4 0 [0.758,11.54] 0.16 0.006 180.23 180.23 0.62
5 0 [0.916,16.74] 0.14 0.004 181.49 181.49 0.65
6 0 [1.000, 11.629] 0.085 0.000 182.25 182.25 0.67
7 0 [1.000,3.926] 0.044 0.000 185.88 185.88 0.75
8 0 [1.000,1.551] 0.026 0.000 194.97 194.97 0.96
Table 4b: Baseline Model: Optimized IFBj rules with ZLB Constraint.
j wr [ρ,θπ] σ2
r Prob ZLB Ω(wr) Ω(0) ce
0 40 [0.691,1.153] 0.25 0.023 194.22 189.65 0.78
1 25 [0.627,3.222] 0.24 0.021 185.52 182.52 0.61
2 5 [0.515,7.567] 0.24 0.021 181.92 181.32 0.57
3 0 [0.607,8.563] 0.18 0.009 181.98 181.98 0.57
4 0 [0.772,10.06] 0.14 0.004 183.26 183.26 0.60
5 0 [0.956,23.45] 0.14 0.004 184.56 184.56 0.65
6 0 [1.000,10.19] 0.075 0.000 185.14 185.14 0.67
7 0 [1.000,3.489] 0.039 0.000 189.81 189.81 0.78
8 0 [1.000,1.454] 0.024 0.000 199.82 199.82 1.01
Table 4c: Model 2: Optimized IFBj rules with ZLB Constraint.32
ECB
Working Paper Series No 870
February 2008
j wr [ρ,θπ] σ2
r Prob ZLB Ω(wr) Ω(0) ce
0 50 [0.750,1.550] 0.25 0.023 179.05 172.74 0.65
1 10 [0.038,12.55] 0.23 0.019 169.02 167.87 0.57
2 0 [0.513,8.738] 0.16 0.006 168.24 168.24 0.58
3 0 [0.713,10.73] 0.14 0.004 168.96 168.96 0.60
4 0 [0.813,10.50] 0.099 0.000 169.52 169.52 0.61
5 0 [1.000,21.18] 0.096 0.000 170.11 170.11 0.62
6 0 [1.000,7.113] 0.048 0.000 171.96 171.96 0.67
7 0 [1.000,2.727] 0.028 0.000 178.32 178.32 0.81
8 0 [1.000,1.190] 0.018 0.000 190.41 190.41 1.08
Table 4d: Model 3: Optimized IFBj rules with ZLB Constraint.
j wr [ρ,θπ] σ2
r Prob ZLB Ω(wr) Ω(0) ce
0 40 [0.716, 1.086] 0.25 0.023 182.89 177.75 0.75
1 0.75 [0.800, 2.155] 0.18 0.009 172.65 172.58 0.60
2 5 [0.505, 6.795] 0.25 0.023 172.26 172.03 0.59
3 0 [0.601, 7.338] 0.17 0.008 172.73 172.73 0.60
4 0 [0.772, 8.203] 0.13 0.003 174.44 174.44 0.64
5 0 [0.912, 14.075] 0.12 0.002 175.82 175.82 0.67
6 0 [1.000, 10.330] 0.078 0.000 176.35 176.35 0.68
7 0 [1.000, 3.582] 0.039 0.000 179.90 179.90 0.76
8 0 [1.000, 1.475] 0.024 0.000 188.82 188.82 1.19
Table 4e: Model 4: Optimized IFBj rules with ZLB Constraint.33
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Figure 2: Optimal Forward Horizon in IFBj Rules for Baseline Model








































Figure 3: Indeterminacy Boundary for all Models. ρ =1 .






































Figure 4: Indeterminacy Boundary for Baseline Model and Optimized Rules:
ρ =1 .34
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A number of points emerge. First optimized IFBj rules improve stabilization perfor-
mance in terms of welfare as the forward horizon j increases from j = 0 (a current inﬂation
rule) to j =1f o rm o d e l3a n dj = 2 for the other three models. But as j increases further
the rules deteriorate and sharply so for j ≥ 6. Figure 2 shows that the optimal horizon is
reached at j =1o rj = 2 for the four model variants. The reason for this deterioration
is the existence of a downward-sloping indeterminacy boundary:a sj increases the upper
bound on θπ for which the rules deliver determinacy falls. This indeterminacy boundary
is shown in Figure 3 for all three model variants. The existence of this downward-sloping
boundary acts as a constraint on the optimal choice of θπ, as illustrated in Figure 4 for
t h eb a s e l i n em o d e l . 22 This is the “too much, too soon” result ﬁrst shown by Batini and
Pearlman (2002).
Second, as rules become more forward-looking the interest rate variance falls and at
j =2o rj = 3, depending on the model, the ZLB constraint ceases to bind.
Third, as the horizon j increases the optimized IFBj rules become more inertial (i.e.,
ρ increases). For j ≥ 6 in all models they become integral rules (so an IFB rule becomes
a price level forecast rule). Finally, compared with the optimal rule there is a signiﬁcant
welfare loss from the restriction implied by pursuing IFBj rules. At optimal horizons with
j =1o rj = 2 this loss is equivalent to a permanent consumption loss of ce =0 .57−0.59%
depending on the model. For j = 8 this loss rises to around 1% for models 1 - 2, 1.08%
for model 3 and 1.19% for model 4.
5.3 Calvo-Type Interest-Rate Rules
An alternative way of thinking about IFB rules, ﬁrst raised by Levine et al. (2007a), is in
terms of Calvo-type interest-rate rules.23 To formulate this ﬁrst deﬁne the discounted sum
of future expected inﬂation rates as
Θt =( 1− ϕ)Et(πt + ϕπt+1 + ϕ2πt+2 + ··· ); ϕ ∈ (0,1) (95)
Then
ϕEtΘt+1 − Θt = −(1 − ϕ)πt (96)
22Figures 3 and 4 start at j = 5, because below this horizon the indeterminacy boundary occurs at very
high values of θπ and there is no real indeterminacy problem.
23We use this terminology since they have the same structure as Calvo-type contracts. (Calvo (1983)).
One can think of the rule as a feedback from expected future inﬂation which continues in any one period
with probability ϕ and is switched oﬀ with probability 1 − ϕ. The probability of the rule lasting for just
j periods is then (1− ϕ)ϕ
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With this deﬁnition, a rule of the form
rt = ρrt−1 + θπΘt (97)
emerges which describes feedback on forward-looking inﬂation with a mean lead horizon
of
ϕ
1−ϕ.T h u sw i t hϕ =0 .5, for example, we have a Calvo-type rule that compares with
(94) with a horizon j =1 .I ti so fi n t e r e s tt on o t et h a tf o rρ ∈ [0,1), this rule can also be
expressed as
rt =( 1+ϕρ)−1[ρrt−1 + ϕEtrt+1 + θπ(1 − ρ)πt] (98)
Whether the rule is expressed in this way or as (97), it is evident that current variables
and one-step ahead forecasts are suﬃcient statistics for the decisions of the policymaker.
Table 5a shows the stabilization performance of the Calvo interest-rate rule as ϕ in-
creases from very close to zero (corresponding to a current inﬂation rule) to ϕ =0 .95
corresponding to a mean horizon of 19 quarters. A striking result emerges: interest-rate
targeting can be very forward-looking with a Calvo rule without the sharp deterioration in
stabilization performance typically seen with IFBj rules. The basic reason for this result
is shown in Levine et al. (2007a) for a simple New Keynesian model: for integral rules
Calvo rules can be shown never to be indeterminate. Our model is more complicated and
not amenable to the same kind of analysis. However we can conﬁrm numerically that in
the whole region of (j,θπ) space of Figure 3 (associating j with
ϕ
1−ϕ), integral Calvo rules
are determinate.
ϕ [ρ,θπ] σ2
r Prob ZLB Ω(wr)=Ω ( 0 )
0.001 [0,5.83] 2.21 0.25 182.15
0.1 [0,6.074] 2.14 0.25 181.76
0.2 [0,6.440] 2.06 0.24 181.33
0.3 [0,6.847] 1.96 0.24 180.87
0.4 [0,7.403] 1.85 0.23 180.37
0.5 [0,8.179] 1.73 0.22 179.83
0.6 [0,9.274] 1.59 0.21 179.24
0.7 [0.3441, 6.779] 0.80 0.13 178.87
0.8 [0.6218, 5.052] 0.37 0.051 178.86
0.9 [0.8075, 5.331] 0.19 0.011 179.44
0.95 [0.8698, 10.229] 0.16 0.006 179.71
T a b l e5 a :B a s e l i n eM o d e l1 :wr =0 , Calvo Price Inﬂation Rule.36
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Table 5b imposes a ZLB constraint on the Calvo rule for each model in turn as in
table 4a. Here and in the rest of the paper we focus on the case ϕ =4 /5a n dϕ =8 /9,
corresponding to a mean forward horizons of 4 and 8 quarters respectively. By analogy with
IFBj rules, we subsequently refer to these rules using the notation Calvoj, j =4 ,8. The
consumption equivalent calculations in the last column conﬁrm the important diﬀerence
between IFBj and Calvoj with a ZLB constraint imposed: as j increases beyond j =4 .t h e
former deteriorate markedly in terms of stabilization performance, whilst the performance
of the latter hardly changes.
Model j (ϕ) wr [ρ,θπ] σ2
r Prob ZLB Ω0(wr) Ω0(0) ce
Model 1 4( 4
5) 14 [0.656,3.791] 0.25 0.023 180.98 179.29 0.60
Model 2 4( 4
5) 14 [0.662,4.193] 0.25 0.023 183.93 182.28 0.61
Model 3 4( 4
5) 6 [0.695,7.312] 0.25 0.023 168.11 167.38 0.54
Model 4 4( 4
5) 12 [0.678,3.989] 0.25 0.023 172.72 171.28 0.58
Model 1 8( 8
9) 0 [0.789,5.511] 0.21 0.015 179.34 179.34 0.60
Model 2 8( 8
9) 0 [0.786,6.349] 0.21 0.015 182.37 182.37 0.61
Model 3 8( 8
9) 0 [0.823,11.33] 0.20 0.013 167.88 167.88 0.55
Model 4 8( 8
9) 0 [0.786,6.180] 0.22 0.017 171.10 171.10 0.58
Table 5b Optimized Calvoj Rules with ZLB Imposed
5.4 A Labour Market Based Rule
We now examine a current wage inﬂation rule, found by Levin et al. (2006) to have good
stabilization properties
rt = ρrt−1 + θΔwΔwt (99)
where ρ ∈ [0,1],θ Δw > 0. As with the price level rule, if ρ = 1, (99) reduces to a wage
level target rule. Table 6 is analogous to table 5b.
Model wr [ρ,θΔw] σ2
r Prob ZLB Ω0(wr) Ω0(0) ce
Model 1 45 [1.000, 0.873] 0.25 0.023 167.48 161.99 0.12
Model 2 45 [1.000, 0.877] 0.25 0.023 170.77 165.23 0.13
Model 3 45 [1.000, 0.916] 0.25 0.023 159.69 154.15 0.17
Model 4 45 [1.000, 0.919] 0.25 0.023 159.51 154.05 0.13
Table 6 Optimized Wage Inﬂation Rule with ZLB Imposed37
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From table 6 we see that the optimized form of the wage inﬂation rule of the integral
type for all models. Such rules are a substantially better than their IFBj or Calvoj coun-
terparts amounting to an improvement of around 0.4% in terms of a permanent percentage
consumption equivalent. The reason for this result can be seen by recalling that the loss
function penalizes heavily both wage and price inﬂation. A rule that responds to either
will therefore help to reduce expected welfare; but since Δwt =Δ wrt+πt a wage inﬂation
rule implicitly responds to both real wage and inﬂation and has a direct role in stabilizing
employment as well.24
5.5 Summary of Performance of Commitment Rules
To summarize, we have examined the optimal commitment (Ramsey) interest-rate rule and
three forms of simple Taylor-type rules that respond only to expected future or current
inﬂation at some speciﬁed horizon j (IFBj rules); a discounted future sum of inﬂation rates
(a Calvo rule), and to wage inﬂation. We have found that the stabilization performance of
the IFBj rules deteriorates sharply as j rises above j = 5 quarters owing to a determinacy
constraint. By contrast the Calvo rule can be very forward-looking without a losing its
ability to stabilize. The current wage inﬂation rule outperforms either of these rules.
6 Optimal Monetary Policy with Model Uncertainty
In this section we consider model uncertainty in the form of uncertain estimates of the
non-policy parameters of the model, Γ. Suppose the state of the world s is described by















t + Cs t (100)
where zs
t is a vector of predetermined variables at time t and xt are non-predetermined
variables in state s of the world. In (100) it is important to stress that variables are in
deviation form about a zero-inﬂation steady state of the model in state s. For example




Ys where Y s is the steady state of the
model in state s deﬁned by parameters Γs and rs
t = Rt − Rs where the natural rate of
interest in model s, Rs = 1
βs −1. In our estimation however we imposed βs = β =0 .99 so
Rs = R = 1
β − 1, which simpliﬁes robust policy design somewhat.
24Interestingly such a rule is implicitly suggested by a current member of the monetary policy committee
of the Bank of England, David Blanchﬂower (see Blanchﬂower and Shadforth (2007)). Analogous to IFBj
rules, wage inﬂation forecast based rules of the form rt = ρrt−1 + θΔwEtΔwt+j are also of interest, but
are not pursued in this paper.38
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For P-robustness (92) is replaced with the average expected utility loss across a large
number of draws, n, from all models constructed using both the posterior model proba-













We denote the policy rule that results from this procedure, Robustness with Model-
Consistent Expectations. We use the draws from the Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) Bayesian estimation as a representation of the ex post probability distribution
of the parameters of the system. The results that follow are based on n = 5000 such draws
of which proportions 0.09, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.85, corresponding to the estimated probabilities
in table 2, taken from models 1 - 4 respectively.25
However there is one further consideration ﬁrst raised by Levine (1986) that is usually
ignored in the literature. Up to this point we have assumed that in each state of the world,
s, private sector expectations Etxs
t+1 are state s model-consistent expectations. In other
words, in each state of the world the private sector knows the state and faces no model
uncertainty. In a more general formulation of the problem we can relax this assumption
and assume that both the policymaker and the private sector face model uncertainty.
Suppose that in state s of the world the latter believes model u is the correct one. Then
Etxs
t+1 must be replaced by the expectation Etxu
t+1 where the expectational operator at
time t is now conditional on model u.
Consider simple rules of the general form






where D is constrained to be sparse in some speciﬁed way as in the IFBj, Calvoj and wage
inﬂation rules of section 5. In state of the world s with the private sector believing state of
the world r, the system under control (100), with the interest-rate rules (believed by the
private sector) given by (102), has a rational expectations solution with xsu
t = −Nuzsu
t






25We do not incorporate learning about the environment as in Cogley and Sargent (2005), for example.
This is not straightforward when considering our optimal commitment rules owing to their time inconsis-
tency. Learning about time-inconsistent rules must address the question of how a reputation for commit-
ment can be established when the private sector may be unable to distinguish legitimate re-optimization,
arising from new information, from an opportunistic re-optimization that can occur without such new
information. How a central bank can establish a reputation for commitment rules is considered in Levine
et al. (2007c).39
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We denote this by Robustness with Model-Inconsistent Expectations. However
this pairwise optimization with model-inconsistent expectations is computationally very
time-consuming. With n = 5000, and up to 100 calculations of the welfare loss for each
optimized rule over feedback parameters, this involves of the order 2.5 billion optimiza-
tions! We therefore choose a smaller sample of n = 200 MCMC draws. To ensure a
reasonably representative sample from the least probable variants we can no longer choose
draws from each in proportion to the model probabilities. For instance this would lead to
only 2 draws for model 3. We therefore choose draws n1 = 50, n2 = n3 =2 5a n dn4 = 100
for models 1 − 4. Then deﬁne an adjusted probability per pair of draws ¯ pus =
pups
nuns where
pu and ps are the original model probabilities associated with the models from which the















6.1 Robust Rules with Model-Consistent Expectations
In this subsection we calculate optimal simple interest-rate rules IFBj, Calvoj and wage
inﬂation rules. As above, we have done this for various weights on the interest rate in
the welfare loss function. This enables us to calculate the probability of hitting the zero
lower bound for the nominal interest rate. For each of the n = 5000 draws, we calculate
the equilibrium steady state variance of the interest rate. Then for each draw we use the
variance of the interest rate to calculate the probability of hitting the zero lower bound;
once again the average of these appears as Prob ZLB in the tables and the average variance
of these is included in the table as σ2
r. Thus with an equilibrium interest rate of 1% per





















where Z(x) is the probability that a standard normal random variable has a value less
than x.40
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Table 7a represents the results of averaging the welfare loss over 5000 draws, 450 from
model 1, 250 from model 2, 50 from model 3 and the rest from model 4.
j wr [ρ,θπ] σ2
r Prob ZLB Ω0(wr) Ω0(0)
0 45 [0.759, 1.009] 0.25 0.023 235.55 229.89
4 0 [0.87, 8.490] 0.15 0.007 225.6 225.64
8 0 [1.000, 0.650] 0.02 0.000 262.66 262.66
Table 7a Model Consistent-Robust IFBj Rules
How do the robust rules of Table 7a compare with their non-robust counterparts in Ta-
bles 4b - 4e? A careful comparison reveals ﬁrst, that the degree of interest-rate smoothing,
ρ, is higher for robust rules up to the long horizon j = 8 where rules are of the integral type
in both cases. Notice that all the rules satisfy the modiﬁed Taylor principle for rules with
inertia, ρ + θπ > 1, which for integral rules simply becomes θπ > 0 (see Woodford (2003),
page 255). Second, robust rules have a lower response to current or expected inﬂation
(θπ is lower). Robust rules, in other words, respond less quickly and less aggressively to
deviations of current or forward-looking inﬂation from the zero-inﬂation target.26
Table 7b provides outcomes for IFBj rules designed for each model, then implemented
in a model economy described by all four model variants with parameter values taking
central values. These outcomes are compared with those for the robust rules of Table
7a. Now when rules designed for Model i, with central values, are applied to model
j  = i we see two noteworthy results. First, IFB0 rules without robust design are in fact
reasonable robust: Oﬀ-diagonal entries are very close to the diagonal values except for the
rule designed for model 3, without any indexation. Even in that case the drop in welfare
is only of the order ce =0 .03. As well as a drop in welfare the other consequence or
applying the rule for model 3 in the other models is that the ZLB constraint is violated.
However the robust rules avoids the latter, by design, and achieves an outcome very close
to the optimal non-robust rule for each of the models, except model 3 where the cost of
robustness is of the order ce =0 .08.
26The result that model uncertainty calls for a more cautious policy goes back to Brainard (1967), but
contrasts with the robust policy rules that arise from the Hansen-Sargent minmax approach that see robust
policy as being faster and more aggressive.41
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Rule IFBj(i) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
IFB0(1) 186.88 190.20 177.70 178.38
(0.023) (0.017) (0.004) (0.019)
IFB0(2) 186.18 189.65 176.90 177.69
(0.030) (0.023) (0.008) (0.027)
IFB0(3) 188.07 190.02 172.74 177.73
(0.078) (0.064) (0.025) (0.071)
IFB0(4) 186.47 190.06 175.82 177.75
(0.030) (0.025) (0.006) (0.025)
Robust 186.50 189.97 176.49 178.33
(0.023) (0.017) (0.004) (0.021)
IFB4(1) 180.23 indet indet indet
(0.006)
IFB4(2) 180.30 183.26 indet 174.51
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
IFB4(3) 180.75 183.78 169.52 175.01
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
IFB4(4) 180.36 183.31 indet 174.44
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Robust 181.11 184.20 170.07 175.29
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IFB8(1) 194.97 indet indet indet
(0.000)
IFB8(2) 195.78 199.82 indet 189.07
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IFB8(3) 197.93 202.26 190.41 192.82
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IFB8(4) 185.71 indet indet 188.82
(0.000) (0.000)
Robust 205.92 213.74 204.74 200.96
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 7b: Robust IFBj Rules Across 4 Models
Notation: IFBj(i) is IFB rule with j horizon designed for model i from tables 4b - 4e. In
this section with model-consistent expectations, the true model is believed by the private
sector. (Values in brackets are ZLB Probabilities)42
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For IFBj rules, j ≥ 4 applying the non-robust rule designed for the wrong model has
far more serous implications. A rule designed for model 1 leads to indeterminacy when
implemented in the other three models. Model 3 exhibits indeterminacy if subjected to
rules other than the correct one. Again this problem is avoided with the robust rules of
Table 7a, but this comes at a cost of as much as ce =0 .3 in an economy described by
model 2 (γP = γW > 0).
j (ϕ) wr [ρ,θπ] σ2
r Prob ZLB Ω0(wr) Ω0(0)
4( ϕ = 4
5) 7 [0.793,3.316] 0.23 0.019 223.29 222.50
8( ϕ = 8
9) 0 [0.878,5.511] 0.19 0.012 222.88 222.88
Table 8a Model-Consistent Robust Calvoj Rules
Rule Calvoj(i) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Calvo4(1) 179.29 indet indet indet
(0.023)
Calvo4(2) 179.13 182.28 indet 171.20
(0.031) (0.023) 0.027
Calvo4(3) 181.41 183.42 167.38 172.51
(0.11) (0.09) (0.023) (0.10)
Calvo4(4) 179.24 182.41 indet 171.28
(0.027) (0.019) (0.023)
Robust 180.23 183.35 169.66 171.84
(0.017) (0.011) (0.000) (0.013)
Calvo8(1) 179.34 indet indet 171.17
(0.015) (0.014)
Calvo8(2) 179.40 182.37 indet 171.10
(0.023) (0.015) (0.019)
Calvo8(3) 183.26 184.94 167.88 173.79
(0.093) (0.074) (0.013) (0.083)
Calvo8(4) 179.36 182.37 indet 171.10
(0.021) (0.013) (0.017)
Robust 180.68 183.61 169.43 172.00
(0.013) (0.008) (0.000) (0.009)
Table 8b: Robust Calvoj Rules Across 4 Models
Notation: Calvoj(i) is IFB rule with expected j =
ϕ
1−ϕ horizon designed for model i.
(Values in brackets are ZLB Probabilities)43
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Now consider the Calvoj rules. From Table 8a it can be seen that the greater interest-
rate smoothing and less aggressive response to expected inﬂation applies to this form of
rule too. But from Table 8b, although the non-robust form of these rules are prone to
indeterminacy as well, the robust form of the rules comes at a much lower cost of around
ce =0 .02 as compared to the worst case of ce =0 .3 for the discrete IFB8 rule. Policymakers
can be forward-looking in terms of inﬂation targets with robust rules of the Calvo type
and the compromise to achieve robustness does not cost much in terms of welfare loss.
Finally the wage inﬂation rule that was found to mimic the optimal rule in the case
of no model uncertainty, now can be seen from Table 9b to have remarkable robustness
properties as well. Rules designed for model i perform well in model j  = i. Implementing
the wrong rule for the model does not lead to any serious violation of the ZLB constraint.
Robust design, using the rule set out in Table 9a, avoids the latter altogether at a very
small welfare costs indeed. The robust rule in table 9a is, in fact, the non-robust rule in
Table 6 designed for model 2. All our optimized wage inﬂation rules are of the integral
type, but the robust rule is less aggressive than that required for models 3 and 4, and
almost the same as model 1. The Brainard result - that model uncertainty calls for a more
cautious policy - applies to the wage inﬂation rule as well.
wr [ρ,θΔw] σ2
r Prob ZLB Ω0(wr) Ω0(0)
65 [1, 0.877] 0.26 0.025 208.03 199.56
Table 9a: Model-Consistent Robust Current Wage Inﬂation Rule
Rule Wage(i) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Wage(1) 161.99 165.26 154.49 154.40
(0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Wage(2) 161.96 165.23 154.47 154.37
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021)
Wage(3) 161.67 164.92 154.15 154.07
(0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023)
Wage(4) 161.65 164.90 154.12 154.05
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023)
Robust 161.96 165.23 154.46 154.37
(0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021)
Table 9b: Robust and Wage Inﬂation Rule Across 4 Models (Values in brackets
are ZLB Probabilities)44
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To summarize: we have designed robust rules across model variants and for each
across parameter draws taken from the estimated posterior joint distribution, for simple
interest-rate rules of the type IFBj, Calvoj and a feedback from wage inﬂation. A common
result for all rules is that robust rules exhibit the Brainard property of more caution than
those designed without model uncertainty. Where rules are of the non-integral type (IFBj
and Calvoj) the robust ones show more interest-rate smoothing (a higher ρ)a n dal o w e r
immediate response to changes in current or expected future inﬂation (a smaller θπ).
By far the most robust rule, in the sense that its optimized form is not too sensitive to
the model for which it is designed, is that feeding back on wage inﬂation. Robust design
across models or the parameter distribution is not really essential for this rule. The next
best performing rules, Calvoj, however do require robust design to avoid indeterminacy,
but robustness comes at a low welfare cost. IFBj rules again require robust design, but
now for j ≥ 4, robustness comes at a high welfare cost.
6.2 Robust Rules with Model-Inconsistent Expectations
We ﬁnally turn to robust rules where the central bank and private sector have diﬀerent
perceptions of the state of the world. Rules are designed to be robust to outcomes where
t h et r u em o d e li si but the private sector believes in model j  = i necessarily. As explained
in section 6.1 we limit the possible states of the world to a smaller sample of 200 in
total from all four models. Rules IFB0, the wage inﬂation rule, Calvo4 and Calvo8 are
considered in turn.
First consider the form of the robust rules designed for model-inconsistent expecta-
tions in table 10a. To help comparison with the rules in section 6.1 designed assuming
model-inconsistent expectations the latter are reassembled in a comparable table 10b.
Rule wr [ρ,θπ]o r[ ρ,θΔw] σ2
r Prob ZLB Ω0(wr) Ω0(0)
IFB0 55 [0.775, 0.956] 0.24 0.023 242.11 235.48
Wage Inﬂation 75 [1, 0.810] 0.25 0.024 210.32 200.88
Calvo4 20 [0.759, 3.604 ] 0.26 0.025 227.79 225.22
Calvo8 0 [0.851, 5.962] 0.25 0.022 225.54 225.54
Table 10a: Robust Rules for Model-Inconsistent Expectations45
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Rule wr [ρ,θπ]o r[ ρ,θΔw] σ2
r Prob ZLB Ω0(wr) Ω0(0)
IFB0 45 [0.759, 1.009] 0.25 0.024 235.55 229.89
Wage Inﬂation 65 [1, 0.877] 0.26 0.025 208.08 199.56
Calvo4 7 [0.793, 3.316 ] 0.23 0.019 223.29 222.50
Calvo8 0 [0.878, 5.511] 0.19 0.022 222.88 222.88
Table 10b: Comparison with Robust Rules for Model-Consistent
Expectations
Two observations are ﬁrst, the Brainard property that increasing model uncertainty
(now to include private sector expectations) should induce policy caution extends to the
IFB0 and wage inﬂation rules, but not to the Calvoj rules. For the latter adding more
model uncertainty leads to less interest-rate smoothing and a more aggressive immediate
response to an expected inﬂation rate change. However these rules are still more cautious
than their counterparts designed without model uncertainty. Second, the welfare costs
of robust design for this extra uncertainty obtained by comparing the ﬁnal columns of
tables 10a and 10b are ce = .12,. 03, 0.06% for the IFB0, wage inﬂation and Calvoj rules
respectively. These are quite signiﬁcant losses especially for IFB0 and the wage inﬂation
rules emerges with the lowest robustness costs.
To assess the robustness qualities of all the rules up to now we consider the outcomes
w h e nt h et r u em o d e li sv a r i a n ti =1 ,4 with central parameter values, but the private
sector believes in variant j  = i necessarily. Tables 11-14 set out these results for the four
forms of rule in turn.
True Model Model 1 Believed Model 2 Believed Model 3 Believed Model 4 Believed
1 186.88 182.84 166.32 188.94
(0.020) (0.013) (0.001) (0.017)
2 195.04 189.65 172.08 197.51
(0.033) (0.024) (0.002) (0.029)
3 230.33 217.24 172.74 227.03
(0.14) (0.12) (0.026) (0.13)
4 178.72 174.46 156.56 177.75
(0.027) (0.019) (0.001) (0.023)
Table 11a. IFB0 Non-Robust Rules
Notation: In cell ij the IFB0 rule designed for model i from is implemented in model i
with the private sector believing model j. (Values in brackets are ZLB Probabilities)46
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In Table 11a, ﬁrst consider the non-robust current inﬂation rate rules, IFB0, designed
for model variants i =1 ,4 given in the ﬁrst rows of tables 4b-4c. The oﬀ-diagonal cells
indicates two things that can go seriously wrong with these interest-rate rules when private
and public sector perceptions diﬀer. First the welfare loss rises substantially when model
3 (with no price or wage indexing) is the true model, but the private sector believes in
variants 1, 2 or 4 with indexing and makes adjustments to their price and wage decisions
accordingly. The second failure of these non-robust rules is that private sector miss-
perceptions result in a serious violation of the ZLB constraint as can be seen by the large
probabilities of hitting the ZLB in brackets when model 3 is the correct one.
Now consider, in Table 11b, the model-inconsistent robust IFB0 rule of Table 10a
designed across diﬀerent variants and parameter draws within each variant which take into
account private-public expectation diﬀerences. Now a more cautious robust rule satisﬁes
the ZLB constraint coupled with smaller oﬀ-diagonal welfare losses in 9 out of 13 cells.
This comes at a cost in diagonal cells where perceptions coincide which are non-negligible
for model 3.
True Model Model 1 Believed Model 2 Believed Model 3 Believed Model 4 Believed
1 187.30 182.28 165.51 189.51
(.019) (0.012) (0.000) (0.016)
2 196.32 190.49 172.02 199.07
(0.022) (0.014) (0.001) (0.018)
3 228.59 217.24 176.14 225.40
(0.057) (0.041) (0.003) (0.050)
4 178.88 174.45 156.33 178.15
(0.020) (0.013) (0.001) (0.017)
Table 11b. IFB0 Model-Inconsistent Robust Rule
Notation: In cell ij the single robust IFB0 rule from table 10a is implemented in model
i with the private sector believing model j.
Tables 12–14 repeat this comparison for the current wage inﬂation rule and the two
Calvo rules. For the latter forward-looking rules, their non-robust forms in Tables 13a
and 14a can result in indeterminacy when perceptions of the private sector and central
banks diﬀer. Robust rules for model-inconsistent expectations address this problem at the
expense of modest increases on the diagonals. Nevertheless, with Calvo rules, as with the
IFB0 rule there remains some very large entries for a world described by model 3 which47
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are not mitigated by robust design. This suggests that private sector misperceptions of
the correct model are far more serious than those of the policymaker designing the rule.
By contrast, from Table 12 with robust or otherwise wage inﬂation rules, diﬀerences
in perceptions do not create a ZLB problem and large oﬀ-diagonal entries. This rule is
remarkably robust even when designed without model-uncertainty considerations.
Model Model 1 Believed Model 2 Believed Model 3 Believed Model 4 Believed
1 161.99 158.24 143.55 162.34
(0.023) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022)
2 169.64 165.23 149.04 170.36
(0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.023)
3 202.59 193.02 154.15 197.21
(0.026) (0.026) (0.021) (0.025)
4 156.24 152.80 136.24 154.06
(0.021) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020)
Table 12a Current Wage Inﬂation Non-Robust Rules
Notation: In cell ij the Current Wage Inﬂation rule designed for model i from table 6 is
implemented in model i with the private sector believing model j. (Values in brackets are
ZLB Probabilities)
Model Model 1 Believed Model 2 Believed Model 3 Believed Model 4 Believed
1 162.51 158.75 144.06 162.91
(0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018)
2 170.22 165.80 149.60 170.99
(0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018)
3 203.55 193.98 155.06 198.21
(0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020)
4 157.05 153.60 137.02 154.92
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016)
Table 12b Current Wage Inﬂation Model-Inconsistent Robust Rule
Notation: In cell ij the model-inconsistent robust Current Wage Inﬂation rule from table
11a is implemented in model i with the private sector believing model j.48
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Model Model 1 Believed Model 2 Believed Model 3 Believed Model 4 Believed
1 179.29 indet indet indet
(0.025)
2 187.18 182.28 indet 188.40
(0.035) (0.025) (0.028)
3 225.53 212.62 167.39 219.64
(0.18) (0.14) (0.025) (0.16)
4 173.32 169.28 indet 171.28
(0.017) (0.010) (0.025)
Table 13a: Non-Robust Calvo Rules ϕ =0 .8
Notation: In cell ij the Calvo rules designed for model i from table 5b is implemented
in model i with the private sector believing model j.(Values in brackets are ZLB Proba-
bilities)
Model Model 1 Believed Model 2 Believed Model 3 Believed Model 4 Believed
1 179.89 175.54 159.72 180.89
(0.022) (0.012) (0.000) (0.016)
2 188.02 182.95 165.65 189.44
(0.024) (0.014) (0.000) (0.018)
3 222.51 211.60 169.37 217.19
(0.055) (0.035) (0.001) (0.045)
4 173.42 169.36 151.56 171.57
(0.023) (0.013) (0.000) (0.017)
Table 13b: Model-Inconsistent Robust Calvo Rule ϕ =0 .8
In cell ij the model-consistent robust Calvo rule from table 12a is implemented in model
i with the private sector believing model j.49
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Model Model 1 Believed Model 2 Believed Model 3 Believed Model 4 Believed
1 179.34 indet indet 180.27
(0.014) (0.010)
2 187.46 182.37 indet 188.73
(0.026) (0.015) (0.020)
3 226.12 212.81 167.88 220.68
(0.16) (0.12) (0.013) (0.14)
4 173.05 168.98 indet 171.10
(0.022) (0.013) (0.017)
Table 14a: Non-Robust Calvo Rules ϕ =8 /9
Model Model 1 Believed Model 2 Believed Model 3 Believed Model 4 Believed
1 180.33 175.80 159.69 181.31
(0.018) (0.001) (0.000) (0.013)
2 188.50 183.22 165.60 189.90
(0.020) (0.011) (0.000) (0.015)
3 221.65 210.72 169.02 216.64
(0.048) (0.030) (0.001) (0.038)
4 173.53 169.39 151.19 171.72
(0.019) (0.010) (0.000) (0.013)
Table 14b: Model-Inconsistent Robust Calvo Rule ϕ =8 /9
7 Conclusions
We examined robust policy design through the lens of Bayesian and risk management
perspectives. The paper has made two principal contributions to the literature on interest-
rate rules.
First, we have set out a comprehensive methodology for designing rules that are robust
with respect to model uncertainty facing both the policymaker and the private sector. In a
welfare-based study, we reduced the optimization problem to an LQ one using a large dis-
tortions quadratic approximation of the representative household’s utility. In the steady-
state analysis of the SW model with taxes we showed that distortions are indeed large,50
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justifying this form of approximation. Within this LQ framework we imposed a zero-lower-
bound constraint in the design of optimized interest-rate rules. Unlike previous literature,
we assumed both the policymaker and the private sector faced model uncertainty in the
form of an estimated joint distribution of parameters and the estimated probabilities of
four model variants.
Our second contribution involved the application of this methodology to three par-
ticular intuitive and interesting rules: inﬂation-forecast-based (IFB) rules with a discrete
forward horizon, a ‘Calvo’ price inﬂation rule, and a current wage inﬂation rule. We
found that IFB rules with a long horizon perform badly with or without robust design.
Our Calvo rule performed much better, indicating that central banks can (contrary to
received wisdom) be highly forward-looking without compromising stabilization. But, in
a result consistent with Levin et al. (2006), the current wage level rule outperformed these
alternatives by far, whether the rule was designed to have good robust properties or not.
Results on the relative performance of these three rules are naturally dependent on the
model and the variants chosen. As Lombardo and Vestin (2007) and others have shown,
the welfare costs of price and wage inﬂation are sensitive to the modelling of nominal
inertia and labour supply by households. The Bayesian methodology set out in this paper
provides a framework for assessing these rival approaches and their implications for robust
policy design.
A The Hamiltonian Quadratic Approximation of Welfare




βtU(Xt−1,W t) s.t. Xt = f(Xt−1,W t)( A . 1 )
where Xt−1 is vector of state variables and Wt−1 a vector of instruments.27 There are
given initial and the usual tranversality conditions. For our purposes, we consider this as
including models with forward-looking expectations, so that the optimal solution to the
latter setup is the pre-commitment solution. Suppose the solution converges to a steady
27An alternative representation of the problem is U(Xt,W t)a n dEt[Xt+1]=f(Xt,W t)w h e r eXt includes
forward-looking non-predetermined variables and Et[Xt+1]=Xt+1 for the deterministic problem where
perfect foresight applies. Whichever one uses, it is easy to switch from one to the other by a simple re-
deﬁnition. Note that Magill (1977) adopted a continuous-time model without forward-looking variables. As
we demonstrate in Levine et al. (2007c), although the inclusion of forward-looking variables signiﬁcantly
alters the nature of the optimization problem, these changes only aﬀect the boundary conditions and
the second-order conditions, but not the steady state of the optimum which is all we require for LQ
approximation.51
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state X,W as t →∞for the states Xt and the policies Wt. Deﬁne xt = Xt − X and
wt = Wt−W as representing the ﬁrst-order approximation to absolute deviations of states
and policies from their steady states.28




βt[U(Xt−1,W t) − λT
t (Xt − f(Xt−1,W t))] (A.2)
so that a necessary condition for the solution to (A.1) is that the Lagrangian is stationary
at all {Xs}, {Ws} i.e.
UW + λT





t fX =0 ( A . 3 )
Assume a steady state λ for the Lagrange multipliers exists as well. Now deﬁne the
Hamiltonian Ht = U(Xt−1,W t)+λTf(Xt−1,W t). The following is the discrete time ver-
sion of Magill (1977):
Theorem 1: If a steady state solution (X,W,λ) to the optimization problem (A.1) exists,

















s.t. xt = fXxt−1 + fWwt
(A.4)
where HXX, etc denote second-order derivatives evaluated at (X,W). This can be directly
extended to the case incorporating disturbances. Thus our general procedure is as follows:
1. Set out the deterministic non-linear problem for the Ramsey Problem, to maximize
the representative agents utility subject to non-linear dynamic constraints.
2. Write down the Lagrangian for the problem.
3. Calculate the ﬁrst order conditions. We do not require the initial conditions for an
optimum since we ultimately only need the steady-state of the Ramsey problem.
4. Calculate the steady state of the ﬁrst-order conditions. The terminal condition
implied by this procedure is that the system converges to this steady state.
5. Calculate a second-order Taylor series approximation, about the steady state, of the
Hamiltonian associated with the Lagrangian in 2.
28Alternatively xt =( Xt − X)/X and wt =( Wt − W)/W, depending on the nature of the economic
variable (See footnote 9). Then Theorem 1 follows in a similar way with an appropriate adjustment to the
Jacobian Matrix.52
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6. Calculate a ﬁrst-order Taylor series approximation, about the steady state, of the
ﬁrst-order conditions and the original constraints.
7. Use 4. to eliminate the steady-state Lagrangian multipliers in 5. By appropriate
elimination both the Hamiltonian and the constraints can be expressed in minimal
form. This then gives us the accurate LQ approximation of the original non-linear
optimization problem in the form of a minimal linear state-space representation of
the constraints and a quadratic form of the utility expressed in terms of the states.
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πt producer price inﬂation over interval [t − 1,t]
rt nominal interest rate over interval [t,t +1 ]
wrt = wt − pt real wage
mct marginal cost
mrs marginal rate of substitution between work and consumption
lt employment
zt capacity utilization
kt end-of-period t capital stock
it investment




ui,t+1 = ρaui,t +  i,t+1 AR(1) processes for utility preference shocks, ui,t, i = C, L, I
at+1 = ρaat +  a,t+1 AR(1) process for factor productivity shock, at
gt+1 = ρggt +  g,t+1 AR(1) process government spending shock, gt
β discount parameter
γp, γw indexation parameters
h habit parameter
1 − ξp,1− ξw probability of a price, wage re-optimization
σ risk-aversion parameter
φ disutility of labour supply parameter
φF 1+F
Y
Table 1. Summary of Notation (Variables in Deviation Form).57
ECB
Working Paper Series No 870
February 2008
Core γp =0 γw =0 γw = γp =0 γw = γp




0.85 [0.70:0.99] 0.95 [0.87:1.00] 0.85 [0.67:0.99] 0.91 [0.80:1.00] 0.85 [0.70:0.99]
ρC 0.85 [0.80:0.91] 0.87 [0.81:0.92] 0.86 [0.80:0.91] 0.87 [0.82:0.91] 0.85 [0.80:0.91]
ρg 0.93 [0.89:0.97] 0.94 [0.90:0.98] 0.94 [0.90:0.97] 0.94 [0.90:0.97] 0.94 [0.90:0.98]
ρL 0.92 [0.89:0.96] 0.93 [0.90:0.97] 0.93 [0.89:0.96] 0.93 [0.90:0.97] 0.93 [0.89:0.96]
ρI 0.90 [0.84:0.97] 0.92 [0.87:0.97] 0.91 [0.86:0.97] 0.92 [0.86:0.97] 0.91 [0.85:0.97]
S(1) 6.41 [4.71:8.11] 6.23 [4.56:7.92] 6.33 [4.63:8.01] 6.25 [4.56:7.89] 6.32 [4.69:8.07]
σ 1.58 [1.11:2.05] 1.63 [1.16:2.10] 1.61 [1.16:2.05] 1.66 [1.23:2.12] 1.62 [1.15:2.08]
h 0.56 [0.44:0.68] 0.55 [0.44:0.67] 0.55 [0.43:0.66] 0.54 [0.42:0.66] 0.56 [0.45:0.67]
φ 1.93 [0.90:2.84] 2.16 [1.10:3.18] 1.89 [0.86:2.85] 2.17 [1.18:3.13] 1.99 [0.97:2.94]
φF 1.50 [1.31:1.67] 1.47 [1.28:1.66] 1.49 [1.31:1.66] 1.48 [1.29:1.66] 1.50 [1.32:1.67]
ψ 1.96 [1.38:2.54] 1.98 [1.39:2.57] 1.96 [1.35:2.53] 1.96 [1.34:2.56] 1.94 [1.33:2.54]
ξW 0.74 [0.69:0.79] 0.73 [0.67:0.79] 0.73 [0.68:0.79] 0.74 [0.69:0.79] 0.74 [0.68:0.79]
ξP 0.92 [0.91:0.94] 0.91 [0.90:0.93] 0.92 [0.91:0.94] 0.91 [0.90:0.93] 0.92 [0.91:0.93]
ξe 0.76 [0.72:0.80] 0.75 [0.71:0.79] 0.77 [0.73:0.80] 0.75 [0.71:0.79] 0.76 [0.72:0.80]
γw 0.31 [0.14:0.48] 0.28 [0.12:0.44] - - 0.35 [0.23:0.48]
γp 0.42 [0.28:0.55] - 0.40 [0.27:0.54] - 0.35 [0.23:0.48]
θπ 1.70 [1.54:1.86] 1.71 [1.55:1.87] 1.70 [1.54:1.86] 1.70 [1.54:1.87] 1.71 [1.54:1.88]
θΔπ 0.13 [0.06:0.21] 0.15 [0.08:0.22] 0.14 [0.08:0.22] 0.15 [0.07:0.22] 0.13 [0.07:0.20]
ρ 0.97 [0.95:0.98] 0.95 [0.91:0.99] 0.97 [0.95:0.99] 0.97 [0.95:0.99] 0.97 [0.95:0.98]
θy 0.13 [0.06:0.19] 0.12 [0.06:0.18] 0.13 [0.06:0.19] 0.12 [0.05:0.19] 0.13 [0.06:0.20]
θΔy 0.20 [0.16:0.23] 0.19 [0.16:0.24] 0.20 [0.16:0.23] 0.20 [0.17:0.24] 0.19 [0.16:0.23]
sd( a) 0.56 [0.44:0.67] 0.55 [0.45:0.67] 0.58 [0.46:0.70] 0.55 [0.43:0.65] 0.56 [0.46:0.67]
sd( ¯ π) 0.02 [0.00:0.03] 0.08 [0.00:0.16] 0.02 [0.00:0.06] 0.03 [0.00:0.08] 0.01 [0.01:0.02]
sd( C) 2.28 [1.77:2.78] 2.36 [1.82:2.88] 2.27 [1.76:2.77] 2.32 [1.84:2.82] 2.32 [1.82:2.77]
sd( g) 1.67 [1.48:1.85] 1.67 [1.49:1.86] 1.67 [1.49:1.85] 1.66 [1.47:1.84] 1.67 [1.48:1.86]
sd( L) 3.17 [1.95:4.33] 3.19 [1.92:4.31] 3.12 [1.82:4.27] 3.19 [1.98:4.32] 3.19 [1.97:4.34]
sd( I) 0.07 [0.04:0.11] 0.08 [0.05:0.11] 0.07 [0.04:0.10] 0.08 [0.04:0.11] 0.07 [0.04:0.11]
sd( R) 0.07 [0.04:0.09] 0.07 [0.04:0.10] 0.07 [0.04:0.10] 0.06 [0.04:0.09] 0.07 [0.04:0.09]
sd( Q) 7.80 [5.41:10.04] 7.56 [5.33:9.71] 7.72 [5.53:10.00] 7.60 [5.34:9.77] 7.66 [5.58:9.82]
sd( P) 0.17 [0.14:0.19] 0.23 [0.19:0.26] 0.17 [0.15:0.20] 0.24 [0.20:0.27] 0.18 [0.15:0.20]
sd( W) 0.21 [0.18:0.23] 0.21 [0.18:0.23] 0.20 [0.17:0.22] 0.20 [0.17:0.23] 0.21 [0.18:0.23]
LL -263.70 -269.82 -261.44 -265.84 -264.25
prob 0.09 0.00 0.85 0.01 0.05
Table 2. Bayesian Estimation of Parameters29
295th and 95th percentiles are given in squared brackets below the posterior mean estimates, “- ” indicates
not applicable, LL denotes Log Likelihood and prob denotes Bayesian Odds ratios.58
ECB
Working Paper Series No 870
February 2008
European Central Bank Working Paper Series
For a complete list of Working Papers published by the ECB, please visit the ECB’s website
(http://www.ecb.europa.eu).
827   “How is real convergence driving nominal convergence in the new EU Member States?” 
by S. M. Lein-Rupprecht, M. A. León-Ledesma, and C. Nerlich, November 2007.
828  “Potential output growth in several industrialised countries: a comparison” by C. Cahn and A. Saint-Guilhem, 
November 2007.
829   “Modelling inﬂ  ation in China: a regional perspective” by A. Mehrotra, T. Peltonen and A. Santos Rivera, 
November 2007.
830   “The term structure of euro area break-even inﬂ  ation rates: the impact of seasonality” by J. Ejsing, J. A. García 
and T. Werner, November 2007.
831   “Hierarchical Markov normal mixture models with applications to ﬁ  nancial asset returns” by J. Geweke 
and G. Amisano, November 2007.
832   “The yield curve and macroeconomic dynamics” by P. Hördahl, O. Tristani and D. Vestin, November 2007.
833   “Explaining and forecasting euro area exports: which competitiveness indicator performs best?” 
by M. Ca’ Zorzi and B. Schnatz, November 2007.
834   “International frictions and optimal monetary policy cooperation: analytical solutions” by M. Darracq Pariès, 
November 2007.
835   “US shocks and global exchange rate conﬁ  gurations” by M. Fratzscher, November 2007.
836   “Reporting biases and survey results: evidence from European professional forecasters” by J. A. García 
and A. Manzanares, December 2007.
837   “Monetary policy and core inﬂ  ation” by M. Lenza, December 2007.
838   “Securitisation and the bank lending channel” by Y. Altunbas, L. Gambacorta and D. Marqués, December 2007.
839   “Are there oil currencies? The real exchange rate of oil exporting countries” by M. M. Habib and M. Manolova 
Kalamova, December 2007.
840   “Downward wage rigidity for different workers and ﬁ  rms: an evaluation for Belgium using the IWFP 
procedure” by P. Du Caju, C. Fuss and L. Wintr, December 2007.
841   “Should we take inside money seriously?” by L. Stracca, December 2007.
842   “Saving behaviour and global imbalances: the role of emerging market economies” by G. Ferrucci 
and C. Miralles, December 2007.
843   “Fiscal forecasting: lessons from the literature and challenges” by T. Leal, J. J. Pérez, M. Tujula and J.-P. Vidal, 
December 2007.
844   “Business cycle synchronization and insurance mechanisms in the EU” by A. Afonso and D. Furceri, 
December 2007.
845   “Run-prone banking and asset markets” by M. Hoerova, December 2007.59
ECB
Working Paper Series No 870
February 2008
846   “Information combination and forecast (st)ability. Evidence from vintages of time-series data” by C. Altavilla 
and M. Ciccarelli, December 2007.
847   “Deeper, wider and more competitive? Monetary integration, Eastern enlargement and competitiveness in the 
European Union” by G. Ottaviano, D. Taglioni and F. di Mauro, December 2007.
848   “Economic growth and budgetary components: a panel assessment for the EU” by A. Afonso 
and J. González Alegre, January 2008.
849   “Government size, composition, volatility and economic growth” by A. Afonso and D. Furceri, January 2008.
850   “Statistical tests and estimators of the rank of a matrix and their applications in econometric modelling” 
by G. Camba-Méndez and G. Kapetanios, January 2008.
851   “Investigating inﬂ  ation persistence across monetary regimes” by L. Benati, January 2008.
852   “Determinants of economic growth: will data tell?” by A. Ciccone and M. Jarocinski, January 2008.
853   “The cyclical behavior of equilibrium unemployment and vacancies revisited” by M. Hagedorn and I. Manovskii, 
January 2008.
854   “How do ﬁ  rms adjust their wage bill in Belgium? A decomposition along the intensive and extensive margins” 
by C. Fuss, January 2008.
855   “Assessing the factors behind oil price changes” by S. Dées, A. Gasteuil, R. K. Kaufmann and M. Mann, 
January 2008.
856   “Markups in the euro area and the US over the period 1981-2004: a comparison of 50 sectors” 
by R. Christopoulou and P. Vermeulen, January 2008.
857   “Housing and equity wealth effects of Italian households” by C. Grant and T. Peltonen, January 2008.
858   “International transmission and monetary policy cooperation” by G. Coenen, G. Lombardo, F. Smets 
and R. Straub, January 2008.
859   “Assessing the compensation for volatility risk implicit in interest rate derivatives” by F. Fornari, January 2008.
860  “Oil shocks and endogenous markups: results from an estimated euro area DSGE model” by M. Sánchez, 
January 2008.
861  “Income distribution determinants and public spending efﬁ  ciency” by A. Afonso, L. Schuknecht and V. Tanzi, 
January 2008.
862  “Stock market volatility and learning” by K. Adam, A. Marcet and J. P. Nicolini, February 2008.
863  “Population ageing and public pension reforms in a small open economy” by C. Nickel, P.  Rother and 
A. Theophilopoulou, February 2008.
864  “Macroeconomic rates of return of public and private investment: crowding-in and crowding-out effects” by 
A. Afonso and M. St. Aubyn, February 2008.
865  “Explaining the Great Moderation: it is not the shocks” by D. Giannone, M. Lenza and L. Reichlin, 
February 2008.
866  “VAR analysis and the Great Moderation” by L. Benati and P. Surico, February 2008.60
ECB
Working Paper Series No 870
February 2008
867   “Do monetary indicators lead euro area inﬂ  ation?” by B. Hofmann, February 2008.
868  “Purdah: on the rationale for central bank silence around policy meetings” by M. Ehrmann and M. Fratzscher, 
February 2008.
869   “The reserve fulﬁ  lment path of euro area commercial banks: empirical testing using panel data” by N. Cassola, 
February 2008.
870   “Risk management in action: robust monetary policy rules under structured uncertainty” by P. Levine, 
P. McAdam, J. Pearlman and R. Pierse, February 2008.